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Policy Pro and Con
By CmHmLES L. CATX*
AFE-W YSARs AGO the word "Communist" brought to one's mind
the cartoonist's conception of a bearded anarchist, clothed in
black from head to foot, drawing his cloak about him with one
hand, and holding a bomb with a lighted fuse in the other. The
word "Communist" no longer paints such a picture in the mind.
Experience has shown us that Communists of today are people
from every walk of life and we can no longer expect them to
identify themselves by their dress and soap box orations. The
Communist party now seeks to spread its influence in a more sur-
reptitious, but nonetheless sinister way. The ferreting out and
exposure of Communists has become one of the prime concerns
of our government due to the magnitude to which the Com-
munist menace has grown, both abroad and here in our own
country.
The Problem
In uncovering subversive activities and, by so doing, pro-
tecting the American way of life, the government has come face
to face with a dilemma. On the one hand, few will deny that
stamping out Communism is a very real and necessary function
of our governmental agencies. On the other hand, there is the
fact that governmental agencies are hamstrung by the protection
against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution.' Suspected Communists are summoned
* A.B., University of Kentucky, 1951; member of Editorial Board, Kentucky
Law Journal.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. "... No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself..."
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before legislative committees and questioned with regard to their
activities and Communist affiliations. Invariably the proceedings
are stalemated by the witness' simple expedient of refusing to
answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate
him. Liberty loving Americans observe these activities and cry
out in protest, some advocating the repeal of the Fifth Amend-
ment because it:
... clearly serves no good purpose as far as innocent, law-
abiding citizens are concerned but'is being used exclusively
as a cloak for the protection of an endless procession of
Communists, spies and traitors.2
It should be noted at this point that this view is held not only
by irate laymen, wringing their hands at the apparent futility of
our lawmakers to root out Communists, but has been advocated
in the past by imminent legalists who felt that "that curious sur-
vival, the privilege not to testify against oneself, will finally be
seen for what it is, and will then disappear."3 The bootless cries
of panicky citizens are easily dismissed, but the cold logic of legal
writers is sometimes difficult to shrug away. In opposition to
those who seek to abolish the privilege against self-incrimination
there are those who staunchly support the privilege. Chief Judge
Cardozo, the year before he left the New York Court of Appeals
to become a member of the United States Supreme Court, stated
this side of the conflict with these words:
The privilege may not be violated because in a
particular case its restraints are inconvenient or because the
supposed malefactor may be a subject of public execration
or because the disclosure of his wrongdoing will promote the
public weal.
It is a barrier interposed between the individual
and the power of government, a barrier interposed by the
sovereign people of the state; and neither legislators nor
judges are free to overleap it.4
Simply stated, the problem is this. Congress' need to investi-
gate is "more critical now than at any time in the history of the
2 Letter to the Editor of the Chicago Daily News, as cited in Hoffman, Whom
are we Protecting? Some Thoughts on the Fifth Amendment, 40 A.B.A.J. 582, 584
par. 4 (1954).
3 McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 511 (1988).4 Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y., 177 N.E. 489, 491 (1931).
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world";5 yet there is the need to temper Congressional zeal with
the sobering thought that the constitutional privilege is not one to
be taken lightly but is one which "grows out of the high sentiment
and regard of our jurisprudence for conducting... investigatory
proceedings upon a plane of dignity, humanity and impartiality.""
How may the problem be solved? Perhaps it would seem that the
simplest solution would be to abolish the germane phrase of the
Fifth Amendment and give vent to these "immediate interests"7
which are exercising such "hydraulic pressure"" and stamp out the
Communist menace which threatens the security of our nation.
At first blush, this would appear to be no time to subscribe to an
"on the fence" philosophy such as that set forth by Chief Justice
Marshall in United States v. Burr:
When two principles come in conflict with each other, the
court must give them both a reasonable construction, so as
to preserve them both to a reasonable extent. The principle
which entitles the United States to the testimony of every
citizen, and the principle by which every witness is privi-
leged not to accuse himself, can neither of them be entirely
disregard.9
But before summarily subscribing to the abolition of this "ex-
pression of one of the fundamental decenies in the relation we
have developed between government and man", perhaps it
would be well to examine the privilege in more detail and give
further consideration to the arguments advocating its abolition or
retention.
The Privilege-Pro and Con
The major objections to the privilege against self-incrimination
were set out by the New York Constitutional Convention Com-
mittee in 1938 in its consideration of the problem:" (1) The
5 United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (D.C. 1951), afF'd, 203 F.
2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1952), rehearing denied.
6 United States v. White, 822 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
7 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904), (dis-
senting opinion). 8 Id. at 401.
United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14, 692e, at 39-40 (C.C.D. Va.1807).10 Griswold, The Fifth Amendment: An Old and Good Friend, 40 A.B.A.J.
502, 503 (1954).
11 New York Constitutional Convention Committee, Hon. Charles Poletti,
Chairman; Vol. IX, Problems Relating to Judicial Administration and Organization:
Chap. XII, Privilege Against Self-Crimination, at 920 (1938), as cited in 8 WI-
moRE, supra note 12, at 314.
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privilege is a hiding place of crime; (2) only the guilty have use
for the privilege; (8) the accused no longer needs the protection
due to the publicity given to criminal trials, the rule that the ac-
cused shall be represented by counsel, and the facilities for ap-
peal; and (4) the privilege causes a trial to become a game con-
sisting of the introduction of technicalities. In addition to the
above objections there are those who feel that there is no real
reason for not compelling the accused to testify against himself
and that such a rule is repugnant to common sense and logic:
Logically, why should not a person charged with a crime
be obliged to give what explanation he can of the affair?
Why should he have the privilege of silence? Doesn't he
owe a duty to the public the same as any other witness? If
he is innocent he has nothing to fear; if he is guilty-away
with him 1l2
As Wigmore points out, in dealing with the privilege against
self-incrimination there must be a distinction made between: (a)
questioning an ordinary witness, (b) questioning by preliminary
inquisition one who has not been formally charged, and (c) ques-
tioning an accused who has been duly placed on trial by indict-
ment. This paper is concerned with only the first two, since those
sumoned before Congressional committees have not been indicted
nor formally charged in any way. The privilege against self-
incrimination is abhorrent to the advocates of its abolition pri-
marily for the following reason:
Why should we accord such a privilege to the Communist
who is out to destroy the very government that gives him
this right to refuse to answer incriminating questions? ...
If a person is innocent of the charge against him, why should
he refuse to answer questions? And if he is guilty, why let
him refuse? 13
Why, indeed, let him refuse? "It is the duty of a citizen to co-
operate with the government. Traditionally, the honest man has
scorned the refuge of the Fifth Amendment . .. "14 The argu-
12 TRAiN, CouRTs, CR uNALS, AND Tim CAmMOBA, 19 (1912), as cited in 8
WIGMORE EVIDENCE 314 (3rd ed. 1940).
13 Inbau, Should We Abolish the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination?, 45 JouR. Cm,. LA.w 180, 181 (1954-55).
14 Hoffman, Whom Are We Protecting? Some Thoughts on the Fifth Amend-
ment, 40 A.B.A.J. 582, 585 (1954).
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ments for the abolition of the privilege are persuasive, but before
deeming them conclusive, it is necessary to review the arguments
for its retention. In this writer's opinion, the conditions giving
rise to the privilege show the foremost danger in its abolition.
The real danger underlying the discarding of the privilege as no
longer necessary lies in the fact that, without the protection
granted by it, there might result a
... system of administration which permits the prosecution
to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source
of proof .... The exercise of the power to extract answers
begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power.
The simple and peaceful process of questioning breeds a
readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and
torture. If there is a right to an answer, there soon seems
to be a right to the expected answer,-that is, to a confession
of guilt. Thus the legitimate use grows into the unjust
abuse; ultimately, the innocent are jeopardized by the en-
croachments of a bad system.';
This writer is not overly impressed with the argument that the
value of the privilege against self-incrimination lies in the fact
that it "lends substance to the benevolent and protective principle
of the common law that no one is to be deemed guilty until so
proved,"' 6 but is extremely impressed with the logic of an argu-
ment for the privilege's retention which uses as its foundation the
likelihood of abuse of a rule giving prosecutors or investigative
bodies the right to demand a witness' testimony.
The methods of uncovering Communism could very easily
degenerate into a process of "witch hunting" without the constitu-
tional safeguards furnished by the Fifth Amendment. While
there is little merit in retaining the privilege solely because of its
antiquity or merely because we "have through the course of his-
tory developed a considerable feeling of the dignity and intrinsic
importance of the individual man,"'7 the history of the privilege
certainly furnishes ample evidence of the disregard of the dignity
of man without such a limitation on methods of uncovering crime.
The strongest of all the arguments for the abolition of the privi-
lege-that the innocent have no need of the privilege and that it,
15 8 WIxomOnE, EVIDENCE 309 (3d. ed. 1940).
16 Supra note 11.
17 Griswold, supra note 10, at 503.
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therefore, serves only to protect the guilty-may be met by a hy-
pothetical situation set out by Dean Griswold.' The situation is
essentially this: Professor X is a college teacher, an idealist and
slow to recognize realities. He is a native born American, well-
educated, sincere, and loves his country. He joined the Com-
munist party in the middle 1930's while it still appeared on the
ballot as a legitimate political party. He joined the Communist
party because he hated Fascism and felt that the Communists
were fighting Fascism in Spain at this time and that, by so doing,
the Communists were indirectly guarding this country against
Hitlerism. He was a member of a Communist cell which was
primarily composed of teachers, like himself. The Communist
Party knew that the teachers were, for the most part, political in-
nocents, and that they would recoil from any proposal of violence
or sabotage. The party, therefore, did not attempt to subject the
group to discipline or "party-line propaganda" but allowed the
cell to keep its meetings on a high intellectual plane, and kept
the sordid aspects of the Marxist doctrine in the background.
From time to time there were things Professor X did not like, but
then, he reasoned, no political party is perfect. After World War
II, Professor X drifted away from the group. He did not formally
resign, however, but simply stopped going to meetings. By 1950
he realized that he was wrong and that the party had used him
as an unwitting dupe. Nevertheless, he had been a member of the
Communist Party.
Professor X is summoned before a Congressional committee
and is asked whether he is a member of the Communist Party.
He truthfully answers "No". Then he is asked whether he was
ever a member of the Communist Party. While the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950 did not make membership in a Communist
organization a violation per se of the Act, 9 he knows that a num-
ber of Communists have been convicted under the Smith Act of
194020 and that the Internal Security Act of 1950 was enacted
after his membership. Further, there is the possibility of state
prosecution based upon evidence given before Congressional com-
mittees. Considering all these things, Professor X pleads the Fifth
18 Griswold, supra note 10, at 504 et seq.
19 64 STAT. 987 (1950) (codified in scattered section of 8, 18, 22, 50 U.S.C.).
2054 STAT. 670, 671, 18 U.S.C. sec. 10, 11, 18 (1940).
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Amendment. Professor X is certainly morally innocent and prob-
ably even legally innocent, but rather than take a chance on sup-
plying links in his own chain of conviction, he has chosen to re-
main silent. Is Professor X justified in claiming the privilege?
Considering his attitude and intent in joining the Communist
Party and the other facts of the case, the writer agrees with Dean
Griswold that he is justified. Returning to the original argument
of those seeking to abolish the privilege-that the innocent have
no need of the privilege-it is believed that this example demon-
strates a situation where an innocent person does have need of
the privilege against self-incrimination.
Also, consider the innocent person whose heart is pure, but
whose intelligence may be lacking. He has done nothing, but if
he is forced to testify, a clever interrogator can twist his testimony
and distort his explanation to the extent of rendering his testimony
a virtual confession of guilt sufficient to warrant his conviction in
a subsequent proceeding. If investigative bodies could be sure
that every person brought before them was guilty, then the argu-
ment that the guilty do not deserve the privilege and the in-
nocent do not need it would be conclusive. Then, we could say
that the privilege
...helps to create that peculiar air of unreality which
hangs about jury trials in a criminal court. It makes it pos-
sible to go through a certain amount of shadow-boxing in a
case where the defendant is plainly guilty.21
This is the basic argument against the privilege but it seems to
ignore one extremely important consideration. How are we to
determine when the defendant is so "plainly guilty" that he is no
longer entitled to the privilege? If the accused is "plainly guilty"
why is his testimony needed? It is submitted that one may appear
to be "plainly guilty" and still be innocent. That the Fifth
Amendment, in its application, protects the guilty as well as the
innocent, cannot be disputed. However, the privilege against self-
incrimination is representative of our legal system which would
rather free ten guilty men than convict one innocent man. Since
it is oftentimes very difficulty "to distinguish between the lions
and the lambs when they lie down together behind the Fifth
21 McCornick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 511 (1938).
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Amendment,"22 the basic need for the privilege against self-in-
crimination still exists. Furthermore, its existence is justified for
the purpose of stimulating "the police and prosecution into a
search for the most dependable evidence procurable by their own
efforts." -3 Any action taken toward the abolition of the privilege
against self-incrimination at this time would likely be a reflexive
action, mirroring the exigencies of the immediate situation and
taken on the "basis of aroused emotions rather than intelligent
reasoning."24 To become "driveling victims of mob-insanity"25
and cast aside a basic liberty because of the Communist threat
"may well destroy the very thing we are trying to preserve-
democracy itself."26 However, in preserving the privilege, it is
well to observe Dean Wigmore's admonition:
[W] e must resolve not to give it more than its due sig-
nificance. We are to respect it rationally for its merits, not
worship it blindly as a fetish. We are not merely to em-
phasize its benefits, but also to concede its shortcomings and
guard against its abuses .. .The privilege cannot be en-
forced without protecting crime; but that is a necessary
evil inseparable from it, and not a reason for its existence.27
The emergency today is one of momentous importance. It
would be futile to say that it is not. It will be argued today, as it
has been in the past, that "to deny Congress power to acquaint
itself with the facts is equivalent to requiring it to prescribe
remedies in darkness."28 This writer believes, however, that when
the "demands of the democratic parliament for adequate informa-
tion and a successful investigation",29 conflict with the basic need
for protection against the "essential and inherent cruelty of com-
pelling a man to expose his own guilt,"30 that the latter must
emerge superior. Other means must be found to overcome the
difficulty encountered when a suspected Communist pleads his
'2 Hoff-man, supra note 14, at 582.
23 Inbau, supra note 13, at 181. 24 ibid.25 Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. 1Ev. 763, 783 (1934-85).
20 Inbau, supra note 13, at 181.
27 8 WIGMAORE, supra note 15, at 317.
28 Landis, Constitutional Limits on the Congressional Power of Investigation,
40 HMv. L. RL-v. 153, 221 (1926).
29 Ehnnann, The Duty of Disclousure in Parliamentary Investigations: A Com-
parative Study, 11 U. Cm. L. R1,. 1, 3 (1943).3 0 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896).
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Constitutional privilege; ways which may solve the problem with-
out destroying a right which is one of the essential differences be-
tween the American form of government and the form of govern-
ment which is seeking to overthrow it.
Tentative Solutions to the Problem
Since the privilege against self-incrimination should be re-
tained, what remedies are available? How may the pleading of
the privilege before Congressional hearings on subversive activi-
ties be precluded? One solution to the problem might lie in the
passage of appropriate legislation by Congress declaring that the
privilege does not apply to hearings before Congressional com-
mittees since such hearings are not criminal proceedings as such.
A strict interpretation of the words "criminal case"31 might sustain
this, since Congressional committees do not have the power to
convict or imprision. To say, however, that one must testify be-
fore a body because that body cannot imprison him is not only
inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the privilege and con-
trary to court decisions on the matter,32 but repugnant to common
sense.
Another solution to the problem might lie in the declaration
by Congress, again by appropriate legislation, that the privilege,
while applying to committee hearings generally, does not apply
to hearings on subversive activities specifically. Such legislation
might be initially unconstitutional, because the Supreme Court has
expressly ruled that the privilege extends to questions about Com-
munist affiliations,3 but if it felt the need it could reverse itself
and declare such legislation constitutional. The Supreme Court
limited the right of freedom of expression in those situations pre-
senting a danger to the security and morale of the country,3 4
and it is not inconceivable that the Court might feel the present
situation so extreme as to again warrant a stifling of the rights of a
few for the benefit of many. A principle such as this, once estab-
31 Supra note 1.
32 United States v. Jaffe, 98 F. Supp. 191 (D.C. 1951); United States v.
Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491 (D.C. 1951).
33 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 875 (1951); Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 159 (1950).34 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenek v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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lished, is too easily expanded to the point where the pleading of
the privilege would depend upon whether or not Congress has
acted or failed to act with regard to the particular type of hear-
ing, the particular subject matter of the hearing, and the par-
ticular class of persons whose testimony is required. In the
writer's opinion, fundamental privileges granted by the Constitu-
tion are not to be placed upon such uncertain grounds.
Since the purpose of the privilege is to prevent a witness from
being forced to incriminate himself, the privilege might be cir-
cumvented by declaring that the testimony and records of Con-
gressional hearings are no longer a matter of public record and,
by so declaring, keep the hearings entirely secret, even from gov-
ernmental agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This action would be consistent with the reason usually given as
to the purpose behind the existence of legislative investigatory
bodies, that they are necessary to determine what legislation is
needed. 35 Congress could determine the type of legislation neces-
sary and, at the same time, by preventing any further use of the
records, guarantee against a conviction of the witness at some later
date. If future conviction were precluded, then the witness could
not plead the privilege on the ground that his testimony might
incriminate him. Considering, however, that the purpose of Con-
gressional committees is not merely to obtain information es-
sential to remedial legislation, but to expose Communists as well,3
to render the records inaccessible would defeat this very im-
portant function of the Congressional hearing.
The solution to the conflict between the fundamental right of
the privilege against self-incrimination and the need for exposing
Communist activities advanced by Congress is the granting of
immunity to certain persons in exchange for their testimony.37
7.3 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160 (1927); see Landis, supra note74.
3 The following are reports illustrating Congress' power of exposure cited in
Note,,47 COL. L. RExv. 416, 427n. 110 (1947):
While Congress does not have the power to deny to citizens the right to
believe in, teach or advocate communism, facism, and nazism, it does have the
right to focus the spotlight of publicity upon their activities. H.R. REP. No.
2, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1939).
"This committee is the only agency of Government that has the power of
exposure. . . . There are many phases of un-American activities that cannot be
reached by legislation or administrative action ... " H.R. REP. No. 1, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess., 24 (1941).
37 68 STAT. 745 (19.54), 18 U.S. C.A. see. 3486 (Supp. 1954).
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This, it is submitted, is the most logical and satisfactory solution
to the problem.
Immunity-Advantages and Disadvantages
The snarl which results when the need for investigation and
information runs afoul of the privilege against self-incrimination
has been untangled by the granting of immunity. It is not a new
innovation, either in England38 or this country.39 The granting of
immunity precludes the pleading of the privilege in that the
privilege protects against compulsory self-incrimination. If the
witness is granted immunity from prosecution as to any crimes
about which he may testify, his testimony cannot possibly in-
criminate him. If his testimony cannot possibly incriminate him,
then he has no right to invoke the privilege and his testimony may
then be demanded with the penalty of contempt being imposed
if the witness refuses.40 It is apparently well settled that the im-
munity granted must be complete immunity. The first federal
immunity statute, passed in 1857, rendered the witness immune
from prosecution as to "any fact or act touching which" the ac-
cused might be required to testify.4' This statute was succeeded
by one passed in 1862 which provided that "no pleading of a
party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained from a party" could
be used against him in "any criminal proceeding" in any court.4 -
This act was negated by the decision in Counselman v. Hitch-
cock43 which ruled an identically worded statute44 unconstitu-
tional on the ground that a statute preventing the use of one's
testimony against him would not prevent the use of his testimony
to search out other evidence which can be used against him. The
court said that, in view of the privilege against self-incrimination,
a statute, to be vaild "must afford absolute immunity against
38 Trial of the Earl of Macclesfield, 16 How. St. Tr. 767, 1147 (1725).
39 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892).
40 For a discussion of Congress' power to punish for contempt, see Potts,
Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish For Contempt, 74 U. PA. L. Bm,. 691
(1926).
41 11 Stat. 156 (1857), as cited in Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 m. 2
(1954).
42 12 S9(9. 333 (1862), as cited by King, Immunity for Witnesses: An In-
ventory of Cavets, 40 A.B.A.J. 377 m. 1 (1954). 4 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
44Act of February 25, 1868, 15 STAT. 37, as cited in Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U.S. 547, 555 (1892).
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future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates."45
Three fairly recent decisions, the Fitzpatric,46 Jaffe,47 and
Adams 48 cases reiterate this view on the ground that the immunity
statute in effect at that time did not give the full protection af-
forded by the Fifth Amendment since, it too, merely excluded the
use of the witness' testimony and did not completely prohibit
future prosecution.49 Thus, it appears that once a witness is
granted absolute immunity from further prosecution he must
testify, but unless the immunity is complete, he may refuse. Con-
gress, generally, has failed to take cognizance of this requirement
until recently. The Act of August 20, 1954 provides that no wit-
ness, once granted immunity, "shall be prosecuted or subjected
to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing" concerning which he is compelled to testify. 50
The Act of 1954, briefly, operates in the following way: First,
the witness must claim his privilege. Next, the investigating body
must notify the Attorney General of the United States of its intent
to grant immunity and give him an opportunity to notify the body
of any investigations being carried on by that department which
might be hampered by a grant of immunity to the particular wit-
ness. The committee or joint-committee must then secure the ap-
proval of the United States district court for the district in which
the hearing is being held and such approval is entered into the
record as an order requiring the witness to testify or produce evi-
dence. In no case may immunity be conferred unless a majority
of the members present before either of the Houses of Congress,
(or two-thirds of the members of the full committee, if the hear-
ing is before a committee) authorize such grant by an affirmative
vote. The statute does not extend to prosecutions for perjury com-
mitted while giving testimony or producing evidence under its
immunity, but as previously stated, it clearly confers immunity
from prosecution and, in this writer's opinion, will be held valid
and will preclude the pleading of the privilege against self-in-
45 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
40 United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491 (D.C. 1951).
47 United States v. Jaffe, 98 F. Supp. 191 (D.C. 1951).48 Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
49 62 STAT. 838, 18 U.S.C. see. 3486 (1952). "No testimony given by a wit-
ness before either House, or before any committee of either House . . .shall be
used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against him in any court, except in a
prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testimony..
GO Supra note 37.
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crimination by any witness upon whom immunity under the
statute is conferred.
The Act of August 20, 1954, has, like any immunity statute,
certain objectionable features in its application.51 Briefly stated,
they are as follows: (1) the moral questionability of "doing busi-
ness" with Communist underlings and "stool pigeons"; (2) the
difficulty of determining, beforehand, whether or not the informa-
tion the witness possesses is of sufficient value to justify the im-
munity bargain; (8) broad immunity legislation might result in
"immunity baths", whereby the guilty take advantage of an im-
munity against prosecution by worming their way into a commit-
tee hearing on one pretext or another and then purge themselves
of guilt by testifying with respect to a great many "transactions,
matters or things" some of which may be relevant and some of
which may not be so relevant. By the dictum in the Adams case, -52
one might succeed in such a maneuver if he were careful to insure
that his testimony was not offered without ever being questioned
at all and that it was not a "spontaneous outpouring of testi-
mony";53 (4) from the witness' point of view, there is the con-
sideration that, while the immunity prohibits criminal prosecu-
tion, it does not bar civil actions, such as disbarrment of at-
torneys54 or deportation of aliens;5 5 and (5) again from the wit-
ness' point of view, there is the social stigma which attaches to
one who is compelled, through an immunity grant, to admit that
he is or was a Communist. In most cases this social disgrace
would elicit no sympathy, but remembering the predicament of
Professor X, it should be noted that such an admission may work
a hardship on certain individuals. These, briefly, are the objec-
tions to the granting of immunity.
51 For an excellent discussion of the undesirable aspects of the granting of
immunity, see, King, Immunity for Witnesses: An Inventory of Caveats, 40 A.B.A.J.
877 (1954).
52 Supra note 48.
53 Supra note 48, at 181.
54 In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917); cert. denied 246 U.S. 661
(1918).




Considering the situation in its entirety, however, this writer is
drawn to the conclusion that the grant of immunity furnishes a
workable and satisfactory means of retaining the privilege, and at
the same time, insures effective investigation of Communist activi-
ties by Congressional committees. The undesirable characteristics
of the immunity grant shrink to insignificance when compared with
the dangers inherent in the complete abolition of a right so funda-
mental as the privilege against self-incrimination. But, even if
the granting of immunity were not a feasible solution to the prob-
lem, the abolition of a principle so representative of the American
legal system would still be unwarranted and inexcusable. The
Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination must be pre-
served at all costs. It must not be made to bend or give way "be-
cause of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which
appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment". 6 Resting
fundamental liberties on such uncertain ground could well result
in the gradual deterioration and final destruction of the freedoms
we are so earnestly striving to preserve. It is submitted, therefore,
that any compromise of basic rights based on the exigency of the
present Communist threat must be rejected as too inherently
dangerous to tolerate.
56 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (dis-
sent).
